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I. INTRODUCTION

Man's technological achievements stem from his ability to develop an
understanding of the environment and harness desirable characteristics for a
perceived benefit. To achieve the desired result, man extrapolates from the
known to unknown. Because these predictions extend beyond the known
realm, unforeseen problems often develop. Chemicals used in applications
which were initially considered harmless, have, at times, caused unanticipated,
injurious side effects. 1 This phenomenon has been observed for
petroleum-based oils. Over the past several years, scientific evidence has
determined that many common oils - oils used to lubricate automobiles,
industrial machinery and the like - cause detrimental health effects in persons
exposed to them over prolonged periods of time. However, while these oils are
potentially quite harmful, litigation arising out of prolonged exposure to
common oils is minimal; plaintiffs have been slow to bring suit and courts have
been reluctant to assess liability.
This paper explores why there has been so little litigation in this area
considering both the harm posed by used oils and the high rate of exposure in
many occupations. To aid in an analysis, three distinct topics will be addressed.
First, basic information establishing the harm caused by prolonged exposure

1

See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
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to used lubricating oils will be presented which will aid in understanding the
potential liability. Second, existing case law shall be analyzed. Finally, the
development of future litigation will be explored. Plaintiffs in these suits will
typically be persons exposed to used oil by common machine lubrication
applications 2 - occupations such as automobile mechanics, manufacturing
maintenance personnel and industrial machine operators - who have been
exposed to these oils for prolonged periods of time.3 Likely defendants are
companies engaged in formulating, processing, marketing, selling and
distributing these oils.
II. HARMFUL EFFECTS OF COMMON LUBRICATING OILS
Common petroleum based lubricating oil is composed of organic molecules,
the majority of which are polynuclear aromatics (hereinafter PNAs).4 PNAs are
composed of ring-like structures consisting of linked carbon atoms with a
hydrogen atom extending out from each of the carbon bonds. Other atoms,
especially halogens, 5 will readily replace the hydrogen atoms. 6 These rings can
also link with other rings forming chains. 7 The multitude of arrangements
formed by organic molecules accounts for the many physical traits they
assume, from volatile gasoline to solid plastic. Besides affecting the physical
traits, these arrangements have a significant effect on the potential to cause
disease. For instance, several PNAs with four, five and six ring structures are
8
known carcinogens and mutagens.
To understand the harm posed by common oils, it is first necessary to
establish an understanding of the type of injury they can inflict. A toxic
substance is defined as one which is capable of killing, injuring or otherwise
impairing a living organism. 9 The degree to which a substance is considered
toxic is quantified through the science of toxicology, the study of the harmful
effects caused by chemical substances on living organisms. 10 Toxicology

2

For example: manufacturing equipment, automobiles and related transportation

equipment.
3

Personal injury caused by specialty oils such as PCBs, whose harmful effects are
already well established, will not be addressed. See CHARLES A. WENTL, HAZARDOUS
WASTE MANAGEMENT 72 (1989).
4

STANDARD HANDBOOK OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL (Harry
Freeman ed., 1989).

M.

SAtoms of fluorine, chlorine, bromine, iodine and astatine. THE AMERICANHERITAGE
DICTIONARY 590 (2d College ed. 1991).
6

See Freeman, supranote 4, at 4.4.

7

1d.

8

1d.

9

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT (Tom Carson & Doye Cox eds., 4th ed. 1992).

0

1 1d. at 33.
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divides the type of harm produced by a toxic substance into two categories,
acute and chronic.11 Acute toxicity is the immediate onset of illness or death as
a result of exposure to a substance. 12 Chronic toxicity is the onset of disease
that occurs many years after the person has received long-term exposure to a
substance. Symptoms of chronic toxicity include a reduction in life expectancy,
susceptibility to disease, cancer, harm to developing fetuses and mutation of
future offspring. These symptoms manifest themselves as diseases such as
13
silicosis and asbestosis.
Millions of persons come into daily contact with used oil and suffer no
immediate harm. Therefore, the primary concern in exploring the harmful
effects from exposure to used lubricating oils is the potential for chronic
disease. Because of the long latency periods and interrelated causes of chronic
toxicity symptoms, the precise effects of chronic toxicity are difficult to
pinpoint.14 This difficulty, combined with the multitude of molecular
structures that organic molecules can form, have resulted in much controversy
regarding the toxicity of oil.
Those not wanting to see common lubricating oils classified as hazardous
argue that the harmful PNAs can be removed during the petroleum refining
process.15 This contention is sound for new, clean oils. However, as oil is
working its magic inside the bowels of machinery, subject to extreme
temperature and pressure, it undergoes physical and chemical changes,
resulting in a potpourri of PNAs, some inevitably toxic. 16 In internal
combustion engines this phenomenon is amplified by minute amounts of fuel
which constantly seep from the combustion chamber into the crankcase,
mixing with the engine's oil. These fuels are recognized toxicants because they
17
contain known carcinogens such as benzene and lead.
The fact that it is used oil which acquires harmful characteristics magnifies
the health risk. Although the refining and processing of crude oil can remove
known carcinogens, people are most likely to come into contact with used, and
therefore carcinogenic, oil. New oil is easily controlled; it is either poured or
pumped from clean, new containers. However, after transportation equipment
and industrial machinery have been used, worn and broken, someone must
change the spent oil, repair the worn chain, gear or ball bearing. All of these
components are covered in used, and inevitably toxic, oil. It is a common sight
in factories and repair shops to see workers with hands, clothes and faces
covered with used oil.
1Id. at 36.
12

1d.

13

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 36.

14

1d. at 37.
1557 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992).

16
7

See Freeman, supra note 4, at 4.4.

1 See I JOHN-MARK STENSVAAC, CLEAN AIR ACT: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.2 (1991).
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Perhaps one reason many persons do not recognize the harmful propensities
of oil is because the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA) has
not classified it as "hazardous." Failure to classify oil as hazardous may lead
people to believe that oil is not as potentially dangerous as other listed
hazardous substances.18 The EPA, however, has recognized the toxicity of
common oil but has declined to list it as hazardous because of political
considerations.
In 1978, the EPA initially proposed to list used oil as a hazardous waste based
on its toxicity when first promulgating regulations pursuant to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.19 However, before the EPA could
finalize its rule, Congress enacted the Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, causing
the EPA to defer listing oil as hazardous out of fear that such a classification
20
would impede used oil recycling.
The EPA's failure to list used oil as hazardous does not diminish the fact that
the EPAhas recognized its toxicity. In proposing rules and requesting comment
concerning regulations covering used lubricating oil, the EPA discussed
methods for distinguishing between hazardous waste and used oil. After the
comment period, the agency concluded that it is often impossible to distinguish
between used lubricating oils and listed hazardous waste.21 In another report,
responding to questions whether oil could be used to control dust on unpaved
roads, the EPA recommended against such use because the "components in oil
are toxic to humans and the environment."22
Congress has been active in the political controversy concerning used oil's
harmful propensities. It recognized the harmful effects posed by used oils and
the societal effects that a "hazardous" listing would have by proposing
legislation to "prohibit the administrator of the EPA from listing or identifying
used oil as a hazardous waste."23
Due to the political pressure exerted against listing used oils as hazardous
and in spite of its harmful propensities, the EPA decided that used oil would
not be listed as hazardous even if it displays the characteristics of a hazardous
material where those hazardous characteristics developed through
degradation during use.24 Here, the EPA acknowledged that an oil, which

18Many specific forms of PNAs arelisted as toxic by the EPA, including benzene and

its variations, phenols and halogenated hydrocarbons. See 40 C.F.R. S 261, Appendix
VII (1994).
1943 Fed. Reg 58,946 (1978).
2045 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980).
2150 Fed. Reg. 1684 (1985).
22
Federal Environmental Superfund Records of Decision, Sept. 29, 1988, available in
WESTLAW, EDR-ID 1000405018.
23S. Rep. No. 478,101st Cong., 2nd Sess. at 20 (1990); S. Rep. No. 72,102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. at 194 (1991).
2457 Fed. Reg. 21,524 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992).
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when new may have had all known chronic toxicants removed, could develop
hazardous characteristics due to chemical changes during use.
The Department of Labor also recognized the dangers of common oils when
promulgating regulations addressing the harmful effects which exposure to oil
has on employees. 25 An Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(hereinafter OSHA) standard was amended to provide for additional
protection during site characterization, analysis and material handling
activities. 26 In a decision to include waste oil in the regulations, 27 OSHA
concluded that "many petroleum products present health hazards .... In
addition they often contain fractions which present high health hazards."2 8
Private groups concerned with environmental degradation have also
recognized oil's toxicity. Jacqueling M. Warren, of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, gave specific reasons why used oil should be treated as a
hazardous substance. 29 She noted that studies have consistently found that oils
contain significant concentrations of substances which are known toxicants
and carcinogens, including lead, cadmium, arsenic and solvents such as
30
benzene.
Various studies also point to the toxicity of oil. In a study performed to
determine whether a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
should be granted, the researchers found that the mortality rate of duck
embryos significantly increased after the embryos were treated with oil. 31 The
report concluded that the higher mortality rates were the direct result of the
toxic nature of the oil.32 Some of the general pathological effects observed
during the study resulting from the direct ingestion of oil by waterfowl include:
lipik pneumonia, gastrointestinal irritation, fatty livers, enlarged adrenal
glands and damage to the kidneys and pancreas. 33 In other animal tests, oils
derived from shale have been shown to cause such harmful effects as skin
inflammations, degenerative changes in internal organs, a reduction in thyroid
functions and derangement of the nervous system. Human exposure results in

2554 Fed. Reg. 9,294 (1989).
26

d. at 2.

27

See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120, Appendix A & B (1994) (regulations dealing with

hazardous waste operations and emergency response and covering personal protective
equipment and levels of protection).
2854 Fed. Reg. 9,302 (1992).
29

Chemical Reg. Daily (BNA), p. 13 (May 22, 1992).

3040 C.F.R. § 261, Appendix VII (1994).
31National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Application No.
ME0022420 (1981), availablein WESTLAW, file No. 1981 WL 40361.
32
1d. at "187.
33

1d. at *356.
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a decrease of immunologic resistance, impaired peripheral blood circulation
34
and derangement of the central and autonomic nervous system.
Governmental agencies charged with protecting the public health, together
with private researchers, have recognized the toxic propensities of used oils.
After reviewing the evidence pointing toward the chronic effects which result
from prolonged exposure to used oil, persons who may have been skeptical of
the potential harm are likely to acknowledge the danger posed by used oil.
Following this line of reasoning, one is likely to conclude that suits resulting
from the harm caused by used oil must be relatively common. This, however,
is not the case; suits in tort due to chronic illness caused by prolonged exposure
to used oils are rare.

III. CURRENT LITIGATION DUE TO OILS HARMFUL PROPENSMES
Research into existing case law concerning harmful, chronic effects of used
oil reveals only one case directly on point. In Sweger v. Texaco, Inc.,35 a life long
auto mechanic alleged that prolonged exposure to used motor oil caused him
to develop cancer.36 However, the District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma disagreed and granted summary judgment for the defendant oil
companies. The trial court reasoned that Sweger had failed to establish a causal
link between his illness and the defendants' products. In attempting to
establish causation, Sweger had relied on the testimony of an expert witness,
Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
decision after reviewing the relevant evidence presented at trial, including the
testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum. 37 The court upheld the trial court decision because
of a conflict between the two main theories of causation presented by Sweger.

34

H. Kahn, SCANDINAVIAN J. OF WORK ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH, Vol. 5, 1-9

(1979)(in a study conducted to determine the toxicity of oil products derived from shale,
phenols were found - a proven carcinogen).
35
No. 88-1781, 88-1834 and 88-2745, 1991 ALLFEDS WL 35345 (10th Cir. Feb. 22,
1991).
36
But see Royal Globe Ins. v. Great American Ins. Corp., 325 N.W. 2d 556 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982). The plaintiff alleged that his 37 years of daily exposure to the defendant's
oil caused him to develop cancer. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The appellate court held that summary judgment
was inappropriate because all of the necessary facts required to render summary
judgment were not heard by the trial court. The appellate court reasoned that the lower
court failed to hear any medical testimony which would establish a causal link between
the defendant's oil and the plaintiff's cancer.
Although this case is significant in that it establishes a basis for suit where
prolonged exposure to an oil resulted in cancer, the record contains no information on
the type of oil. The only information given was that the oil was manufactured by the
defendant to the plaintiff's employer's specification. Therefore, if the oil contained PCBs,
it would not beon point, actions for exposure to oils containing PCBs have already been
established and are not addressed herein.
37

See Sweger, WL 35345, at *5.
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The court reasoned that Dr. Teitelbaum's "one-molecule theory" of cancer
formation 8 conflicted with Sweger's allegation of "market-share liability. 9
The court's reasoning grew out of the dichotomy between the plaintiff
contending that a single molecule initiated Sweger's cancer while, at the same
time, alleging that all of the defendant oil companies should be held liable. The
court further reasoned that Teitelbaum's testimony was inconclusive based on
the one-molecule theory; he could not say which of the defendants' motor oils
interacted to cause the cancer, or when the interaction occurred.4 0
The court also rejected Sweger's argument that, if the one-molecule and
market-share theories were in conflict, the one-molecule theory should be
rejected and liability should be based on the market-share theory alone.41 The
court concluded that, even if it ignored the conflict between the causal theories
presented by the plaintiff, Dr. Teitelbaum's acknowledgment that the
defendants' motor oils may not have been a factor in Sweger's cancer fell short
of the required degree of certainty necessary to establish causation. The court
held that Oklahoma law requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a "significant
probability" that the cancer was the result of repeated and collective exposure
to the defendants' products, and that Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony fell short of
this requirement.42
The fact that the Sweger case failed to establish a cause of action due to
prolonged exposure to common oils should not discourage other potential
litigants from pursuing similar actions. Rather, public policy considerations
driving product liability actions should encourage future litigation in the light
of the potential harm posed by used oils.4 3 In Sweger, after the appellate court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant oil companies, Mr. Otto D.

38

1d. Under the "one molecule" theory, a single carcinogenic molecule from anyone
of the defendants' possibly carcinogenic oils interacted with a single Sweger DNA
molecule and produced cancer.
39

See GARY E. CRAWFORD, BASIC PRODUCT LIABILITY AND ToXIc TORT LITIGATION

112-123 (1990)(Under a "market share liability" theory, a plaintiff is required to identify
the specific products to which he had been exposed and demonstrate that any of these
products would pose a significant probability of causing disease.); See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B(2)(1963) (once the plaintiff has demonstrated that the harm
could have resulted from any of the tort-feasors, the burden of proof is on the defendants

to show their product did not cause the injury).
40 Sweger, WL 35345, at *5 (the appellate court did acknowledge that the plaintiff was
able to prove that he was exposed to all of the joined defendants' products, and that this
was required under Oklahoma law).
41id.
42

1d.

43

Because of the technological nature of today's products, consumers are generally
unable to detect dangers posed by products. Therefore, justice requires that product
suppliers should be held liable for the harm caused by their products, as an economic
incentive to produce safe products, and because suppliers are in the best position to
safeguard users. See CRAWFORD, supra note 39, at 11.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 8:269

Hewitt, appellate counsel for the plaintiff, commented that the carcinogenic
characteristics of used motor oil is not a settled question. Mr. Hewitt likened
the defendant oil companies of today to Johns-Manville of 30 years ago when
it won its first asbestos case. 44
The injury caused by prolonged exposure to oils is similar to that caused by
asbestos4 5 and many other chronic toxicants which have a long latency period
46
between exposure to the product and the onset of discernible symptoms.
Many of these substances were initially considered useful, necessary, and
relatively harmless by those who were in everyday contact with them.4 7
Because of these similarities, precedent based on chronic injury caused by other
substances will provide a background for understanding the potential liability
facing the oil industry.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE LITGATION
Suits involving chronic injury due to chronic toxicity are often referred to as
"toxic torts."48 As in Sweger, the predominant issue arising in toxic tort litigation
generally involves the causal relationship between the defendant's product
and the plaintiff's disease. Because the characteristics which cause chronic
illness are latent, there is often a great deal of difficulty in establishing causation
in toxic tort litigation.4 9

44

Toxics Law Daily, (BNA), May 22,1992, availablein LEXIS BNATLD Database.
45 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, (2nd Cir. 1988)(Johns-Manville was
a major manufacturer of asbestos products and prolonged exposure to asbestos was
found to cause asbestosis and various forms of lung cancer); See also Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)(many cases involving asbestoses
date back to exposure as far as the 1930's); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS INTHE
COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS (1985).
46
See Abaun v. General Electric Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993)(suit for alleged future
disease due to exposure to PCBs - a known chronic toxicant), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1994).
47

See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo'sRetort: PeterHuber'sJunk Scholarship,42 AM. U.L.
REV. 1637, 1726 n.204 (1993).
48

See EDWARD GREER & WARREN FREEDMAN, Toxic TORT LmGATION (1989)(Toxic torts

can fall under almost any of the common tort theories, including trespass, assault,
battery, nuisance, negligence, strict liability in tort and strict liability in warrantee.); See
also McNair v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 890 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1989) (toxic tort
is a cause of action in tort for a breach of implied warrantee due to exposure to, among
others, oil base hydrocarbons); Prego v. City of New York, 247 A.D.2d 164 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989)(the attorney general defined toxic torts as cases arising from injury due to
exposure to substances with latent harmful effects).
49

See Myra P. Mulchay, Proving Causationin Toxic Torts Litigation, 11 HoFsTRA L. REV.
1299 (1983).
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A. Causationand the Expert Witness

Because toxic torts have evolved out of civil common law, the "common
sense of thejury" is generally relied upon to determine whether the defendant's
product was "more likely than not" to have been the cause of the plaintiff's
illness.50 Also, due to the latent nature of the injuries arising in toxic tort
litigation, expert testimony plays a determinative role in clarifying relevant
information for the jury.51 This is accomplished through the expert witnesses'
interpretation of the relevant evidence dealing with a product's toxicity, which
is based primarily on animal studies and epidemiological data. 52
1. Animal Studies
Typically, animal studies are an acceptable basis for an expert witness's
opinion linking the plaintiff's disease with the defendant's product.53 Animal
studies monitor the effect brought on by a substance when administered to an
animal species at a high dosage rate. The gathered data is then extrapolated to
determine the effect of the substance at a lower dosage rate over prolonged
periods of exposure. The likely effect the substance will have on humans is then
inferred from the results of the study.54 However, because of the many variables
which affect the accuracy of this analysis, such as response variations between
humans and animals, along with the inherent inaccuracy of extrapolating from
non-uniform dose-response curves, the findings of animal studies are
controversial and not universally accepted as being determinative of toxicity
in humans. 55
2. Epidemiological Studies
The causal link between exposure to a product and the resultant injury is less
controversial when established through epidemiological studies.56 In an
epidemiological study, a statistical group which is thought to be representative
of the general population is surveyed to determine what percentage of the
50

See GREER, supra note 48, § 5 at 2.

51

See GREER, supra note 48, § 4 at 20.

52

See GREER, supra note 48, § 4 at 17.

5351 Fed. Reg. 33,992, § 6 (1986)(it is reasonable to imply that a substance is
carcinogenic to humans if there is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in animals).
54
SeeGREER, supra note 48, § 5 at 8 (The response in test animals is plotted graphically
against varying dose rates to produce a "dose response curve." From this curve the
effects of the toxicant can be predicted at lower dose rates for longer exposure periods.);
See also ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, PROOF OF CAUSATION AND DAMAGES INToxic TORT
CASES, 49-53 (1988).
55
See Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856 (1986) (limitations inherent in the
use of animal studies); see also GREER, supranote 48, § 5 at 8.
56
See 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986)(EPA accepts a substance as a human carcinogen
when epidemiological studies support a causal relationship).
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population will develop a specific ailment. A second group, which has been
exposed to the substance in question, is statistically analyzed to determine the
percentage of affected individuals. The difference between the number of
affected individuals in the two groups is indicative of the toxicity of the product
under study.57 However, finding that a specific percentage of the population
will be afflicted does not end the legal controversy. There still remains the
question which arose in Sweger:. was the plaintiff afflicted because of his
exposure to the defendants' product or did his disease develop naturally, as
part of the general population which would have been afflicted anyway?58
In determining whether a plaintiff was actually affected by the defendants'
product, courts typically require that the plaintiff establish that the defendants'
59
product was a significant or major factor in causing the plaintiff's disease.
This was demonstrated in the Sweger decision where the Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit determined that Teitelbaum's testimony failed to establish that
there was a "significant probability" that the cancer occurred from "repeated
and collective" exposure to the defendants' products.60
For a plaintiff to successfully fulfill his burden establishing causation, the
expert must be able to testify that the substance was the cause of the disease
using whatever legal rhetoric the jurisdiction requires, such as "major" or
"significant" factor, and not concede that the disease may have resulted without
exposure to the defendants' product. However, even if the expert uses the
required verbiage, the expert's conclusions as to the origin of the plaintiff's
disease may still not be adequate to establish causation. First, the jury could
elect not to believe the witness. Also, the expert's testimony could be rejected
by a judge, before the case ever gets before the jury if the judge determines that
the testimony will not assist the jury or the opinion is not generally accepted
by the scientific community.61 Often, this approach is taken because "justice"
requires the expert's testimony to be discounted, where an expert testifies with-

57

See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proofin Toxic Tort Litigation,52
FORDHAM L. REv. 732 (1984).
58
See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987)(expert witness conceded
that plaintiff's symptoms could have had many causes); Intalco Aluminum Corp. v.

Department of Labor and Indus., 833 P.2d 390 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)(the causal
relationship does not have to be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies
before a witness can testify that the relationship exists).

59 Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (1993)(a plaintiff must show that exposure
was a substantial factor in causing his disease); See also Burton v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
613 F. Supp. 91 (W.D.Pa. 1985)(expert's testimony that defendant's product was a
significant or major factor in causing plaintiff's disease was sufficient to prove
causation).
60 See Sweger, WL 35345, at *4.
61

See C. MARc WHrTEHEAD, PREPARING A Toxic TORT CASE FOR TRIAL 107-123

(1991)(preparing an expert witness for a toxic tort trial); See also GREEP, supra note 48,
§4 at 19.
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out a firm factual basis. 62 Still, some courts have upheld the validity of expert
testimony if the expert was able to draw a firm conclusion as to the cause of a
plaintiff's disease, even where definitive animal and epidemiology studies
were lacking. 63
3. Class Actions
Even though toxic torts rely heavily on the credibility of an expert witness
to establish causation, as more suits are successfully litigated, reliance on this
testimony becomes less crucial. As the number of suits entering the court
system increase, they are often combined into "class actions" where a multitude
of plaintiffs are represented in a single case. 64
The burden of proof for establishing causation is diminished through
precedent, implicating the defendant's product as unreasonably dangerous.
Precedent is established through "test cases," where plaintiffs are selected based
on their exposure histories and injuries, with those who stand the best chance
of success being chosen. 65 After the "test cases" have demonstrated that a cause
of action is legitimate, the problem becomes one of determining whether an
individual plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's product, thus reducing the
dependance on expert testimony.66 In determining whether a plaintiff's
exposure to a product was sufficient to establish causation, courts have
employed a "frequency, regularity and proximity test."67 As awards for
damages become even more common, some courts have concluded that
exposure to a substance is harmful "as matter of law," thus eliminating the
necessity for expert testimony altogether.68
Because oil is such a common substance in our society, millions of people are
exposed to it on a daily basis. Like many other substances which were initially

62

See e.g., Abaun, 3 F.3d at 334 (in a case alleging risk of future cancer based on a
single exposure to PCBs, the trial court held that the plaintiff's expert witnesses had
failed to establish causation where a theoretical analysis of the plaintiff's exposure by
one expert was superfluous and blood tests by a medical doctor failed to reveal any
difference between the plaintiff and the general population.).
63

See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(causal
relationship does not have to be clearly established by animal or epidemiology studies
before an expert can testify), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984).
64

See generally HENSLER, supra note 45.

65See WHITEHEAD, supra note 61, at 185-286 (use of class action suits, test cases and
bifurcation in toxic torts).
66
See HENSLER, supra note 45, at 116 (a critical issue in mass torts is the relationship
between the exposure and the disease); but see Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d
1182 (5th Cir. 1981)(all asbestos products are not "unreasonably dangerous" as a matter
of law).
67

See Tragarz, 980 F.2d 411 at 421 (the "frequency, regularity and proximity test"
focus on the plaintiff's exposure rather than the effect of the exposure).
68

Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
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regarded as harmless but were later shown to cause chronic injury,69 initial suits
involving latent harm caused by used oils must be successfully litigated though
the use of well-prepared test cases. These cases will require that causation be
established through expert testimony based on relevant toxicology data.
4. Other Issues
In the Sweger decision, the appellate court raised two other elements in
addition to causation on which the plaintiff has the burden of proof in order to
maintain a products liability action. First, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's product was defective at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control. Second, the plaintiff must show that the product was
unreasonably dangerous. 70
a. Existing Defects
The first requirement, determining whether the product was defective at the
time it left the defendant's control, appears reasonable when considered under
typical product liability actions. This element is often used as a defense where
the defendant is able to show that someone outside of his control modified the
product and the modification rendered the product unsafe. 71 However, in a
case alleging chronic injury due to the harmful effects of prolonged exposure
to used oil, a defendant will likely ask the court to apply this rule in a strict
manner, arguing that the oil was non-toxic when it left the control of the
manufacturer and that they should not be held liable for any change the oil
undergoes during use.
The Sweger decision gives no indication of how a court would handle this
issue because summary judgment was granted based on causation and the
court refused to address this issue. Also, there is no direct precedent addressing
the issue of a toxic product undergoing physical change during use. Typically,
substances involved in toxic tort litigation are harmful as manufactured. 72
Although a plaintiff has a high hurdle to overcome in establishing a
defendant's liability where the product underwent change after leaving the
defendant's control, the hurdle is not insurmountable. A plaintiff will have a
strong argument based on the fact that change which the oil undergoes is
known to occur. This argument will rely on the generally accepted product
liability doctrine requiring manufacturers to warn buyers of latent defects

69

1n re Joint E. &S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Bliken, 129 B.R. 710 (E.D. N.Y. 1991)(as of
June, 1991, there were approximately 10,000 cases involving asbestos related injuries
filed in the state and federal courts of Mississippi).
70
See Sweger, WL 35345, at *3.
71 See Hammond v. Int'l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3rd Cir. 1982)(product defect is
solely a function of the condition in which a product is sold).
72 See generally GREER, supra note 48.
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which the manufacturer learns of after the sale has occurred and the product
has left the manufacturer's control. 73
An additional argument on the plaintiff's behalf which will aid in
establishing liability against an oil supplier who contends his product was
harmless when it left his control is found in the Second Restatement Of Torts
(1965). The wording of § 402A.(1)(b) provides liability for selling a product that
is unreasonably dangerous if it is "expected to and does" reach the consumer
without substantial change. Although this references the product as not
undergoing change, it also implies that a seller should have knowledge of
"expected" change which might occur to his product Thus, it establishes a duty
on a seller to know the condition of his product when it comes into contact with
the public. It follows that if the seller knows the product will become harmful,
the seller must take steps to protect the public, such as issuing an effective
warning.
b. UnreasonableRisk
The second issue which the appellate court raised in Sweger, but did not
address, was whether the risk posed by a product was unreasonable. 74 A
plaintiff attempting to establish a cause of action based on chronic injury due
to prolonged exposure to used oil will typically be required to prove that the
risk posed by the product was unreasonable. 75 The courts generally employ a
balancing test where the utility of the product is weighed against the potential
harm caused by the product and the ability of the defendant to guard against
that harm. A "risk-utility" test is typically applied to a product liability suit in
determining whether the risk posed by a substance is reasonable. 76
In establishing a cause of action based on chronic injury caused by the toxic
effects of used oil, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to challenge the utility
of lubricating oils in our society.77 However, the issue of whether the
defendant's efforts to guard against the harm posed by prolonged exposure to
73
See Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfr. Co., 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993)
(manufacturer of farm equipment has post-sale duty to make reasonable effort to warn
of latent hazards which were unforeseen at time of manufacture and sale).
74
See Sweger, WL 35345, at *3.
75

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment i, (1977)(many products

cannot be made entirely safe, therefore, some degree of risk is necessary).
76
See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985)(risk utility test employed
in personal injury suit against manufacture of handguns, the court held there was no
liability; the handgun functioned as intended and the dangers of handguns are well
known); Carson v. BIC Corp., 1993 WL 53540 (E.D. Mich. 1993)(risk-utility test used to
determine whether disposable lighter manufacturer exercised reasonable care in
design); Bondiev. BIC Corp., 739 F. Supp.346 (E.D. Mich. 1990)(courtapplied risk-utility
test and found that manufacturer had duty to design childproof lighter).
77

1n 1980, the United States produced 947,905,000 barrels of oil which amounted to

only 4.3% of the nation's total demand. THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 130

(Hana U. Lane ed., 1982).
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used oil was reasonable in light of possible safeguards which could have been
employed is likely to result in much controversy.78
When dealing with "toxic torts," where improper use leads to unnecessary
exposure, and the resulting harm stems from that exposure, the courts
generally impose a duty on the manufacturer to issue a warning which will
allow the product's user to guard against harmful exposure. Failure to warn of
the potential harm would constitute a breach of the duty by exposing users to
"unnecessary risk." This has been demonstrated in many product liability cases
where the defendant's failure to warn was a main issue at trial. 79
The warnings issued to users that are currently employed by oil suppliers
consist mainly of Material Safety Data Sheets (hereinafter MSDS) in industrial
environments, 80 and printed warnings on oil containers for consumers. 81
Whether these warnings are sufficient will undoubtedly lead to controversy in
future litigation.
Manufacturers and suppliers of chemical substances are responsible for
performing toxicology tests on the chemicals they produce and, pursuant to
OSHA, making those results available to persons exposed to those
substances. 82 Chronic toxicity is an item specifically addressed in an MSDS. 83
A review of MSDS for various types of oils demonstrates a tendency on the
part of oil suppliers to reveal a minimum amount of information which would
indicate possible toxicity. Warnings ranging from "Nontoxic (Estimated) 84
to "3/10 rats
Based on testing of similar products and/or the components,

78
See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982)(risk posed by
a product should be reduced as much as possible without hindering utility).
79
See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371 (3rd Cir. 1993)(although defendant knew of harm
posed by asbestos, brochures represented product as "non-toxic," therefore breaching
duty to warn), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993); Repola v. Morbark Indus. Inc., 934 F.2d
483 (3rd Cir. 1991)("failure to warn" suit based on common law "reasonable" test);
Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(advertising and effort
to educate users were issues in finding liability for alleged failure to warn);
Johns-Manville v. Contra Costa Superior Ct., 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980) (fraudulent
concealment of asbestos exposure allowed "action at law" in spite of workman's
compensation).
8029 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1994).
81
Suppliers of motor oil have apparently become concerned with this possibility.
Common 1 quart bottles of motor oil sold to the general public at retail outlets now bear
the label: "Warning: Continuous contact with used motor oil has caused skin cancer in
animal tests. Avoid prolonged contact. Wash skin thoroughly with soap and water.
Launder or discard soiled clothes." Valvoline, Inc., a subsidiary of Ashland Oil, Inc., 1
quart bottle of 20W50 motor oil (Copyright 1991).
8229 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1994).
83
84

d. at § 1910.1200(c).

Material Safety Data Bulletin No. 673590, VASCUL 18F - Metal Processing Oil.
(Mobil Oil Corp., 1989).
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died at this dosage level, considered to be no more than slightly toxic... "are
typical of the listed warnings. 85
In examining the warning of potential harm in an MSDS, "three out of ten
dead rats" seems to indicate that the oil is toxic, but the inference created by the
additional verbiage, "no more than slightly toxic," produces an enigma,
requiring further analysis of MSDS phraseology. In a 1985 MSDS covering
asbestos friction materials, the chronic toxicity was listed as a "suspect
carcinogen." 86 However, by 1985 the carcinogenic effects of asbestos were well
87
established.
Of the least-toxic oil examined, the MSDS stated the oil was "nontoxic
88
(estimated)." This warning would seem to imply that this oil is nontoxic.
However, the "nontoxic (estimated)" rating was based on tests performed on
"similar products." Further examination of the MSDS reveals that the nontoxic
designation was based on "[s]everely solvent refined and severely hydrotreated
mineral base oils [that] have been tested at Mobil's... laboratory... [and]
showed no adverse effects." In this case, the severe solvent refinement and
hydrotreatment operations were likely performed to remove harmful PNAs,
thus rendering this test sample nontoxic. 89 However, once oils have been
subjected to the rigors of service, it is doubtful whether they could be classified
as "severely solvent refined and severely hydrotreated" oils. As previously
discussed, oil undergoes physical and chemical changes during use. 90
The same MSDS also contains some ambiguous wording under the heading
of regulatory information: "The unused product, in our opinion, is not
specifically listed by the EPA as hazardous ... [and] does not exhibit the
hazardous characteristics of Ignitability, Corrosivity, or Reactivity, and is not
formulated with the metals cited in the EP Toxicity Test."9 1 (emphasis added).
Again, the product is likely referred to as "unused" and "formulated" because
92
of the chemical and physical change which the oil undergoes during service.
It should also be noted that a recognized hazardous characteristic, Toxicity, was
specifically qualified as being associated with hazardous metals, and there was
93
no mention of carcinogenic PNAs.

85

Material Safety Date Bulletin for Mobilmet S125 - Soluble Oil Metal Working Fluid
(Mobil Oil Corp., 1989).
86
Material Safety Data Bulletin for Friction Material - Asbestos (Eaton Corporation,
Airflex Div., Nov., 1985).
87
See HENSLER, supra note 45, at 1.
88

Mobil's MSDS No. 673590, supra note 84.

89

1d.
See Freeman, supra note 4, at 4.4.

90
91
92

Mobil's MSDS No. 673590, supra note 84.
See Freeman, supra note 4, at 4.4.

93

See 40 C.F.R. § 261, App. VII.
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Because of the manner in which warnings concerning the potentially chronic
toxic effects of used oil are given, it is questionable whether those warnings are
sufficiently clear. Also, the methods used to warn industrial workers are
questionable as to their effectiveness. For an industrial worker to determine
whether he is being exposed to a chronic toxicant when working with various
oils, the worker must locate all applicable MSDS within his work-place,
interpret the often vague language and then make his own determination of
the substances potential chronic toxicity.94
Vague language used in wording an MSDS covering the harmful effects of
benzene, a substance often found in used motor oils, led the court in Mason v.
Texaco, Inc.95 to conclude that the defendant's warning did not adequately
convey the true dangers posed by the product. The court held that the language
used in an MSDS must be comprehensible to a reasonably prudent person
using the product and that the language should convey a fair indication of the
nature and extent of the product's dangers.96 In reaching its decision, the court
reasoned that the wording "may damage blood forming organs" did not
reasonably convey the actual danger.97 The court reasoned that the words
"may" and "damage" could be interpreted by reasonably prudent user to
indicate that injury is only "possible" and that any injury which did develop
might heal itself or could be repaired or treated. 98 The court held that this
warning was insufficient in light of the scientific evidence indicating that death
inevitably results from prolonged exposure to benzene. 99
Based on the vague warnings issued in these and other MSDS, industrial
workers, being the reasonably prudent users referred to in Mason,100 who suffer
chronic illness due to their prolonged exposure to oils, will have a strong
argument that the oil suppliers should be held liable. This liability would be
based on the suppliers' failure to issue adequate warnings, thus inhibiting the
use of proper protective devices.
In the event that a worker properly interprets an MSDS and determines that
an oil is potentially harmful, he must then employ protective devices, such as
gloves, boots and aprons to prevent exposure. 101 Use of these protective
devices will obviously lead to increased expense, not only for the outward
purchase and maintenance of the protective items, but also for the time

9429 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e).
95741 F. Supp. 1472 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd 948 F.2d 1546 (1991).
961d. at 1483.
971d.
98

1d. at 1484.

99741 F. Supp. at 1484.
1O0/d. at 1483.
10129 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h)(2)(iii).
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required to employ them.102 Where workers are handling substances that have
a well recognized chronic toxicity, it is an accepted part of the standard
operating procedure to use protective devices. However, when dealing with
common lubricating oils which are regarded as harmless,103 it is probable that
workers who attempt to employ protective devices will be looked upon
unfavorably by their employers. Employee requests for protective devices will
be considered disruptive, affecting the workers' chances for future
advancement, or even the job itself. 10 4
In determining whether the oil suppliers have fulfilled their duty to protect
users from the harmful propensities of oil, the courts will consider the
availability, and non-use, of self-contained systems. Systems are available
which allow the removal of used oils from machinery, thus minimizing the
potential for human exposure. 105 It would seem a strong argument on behalf
of the plaintiffs that, had the harmful propensities of used oil been better
appreciated because of more clearly expressed warnings, these self-contained
systems may have been employed. 106 The courts could find that persons were
exposed to an unreasonable risk because of their failure to appreciate the
potential for harm and employ available safety precautions.
In their defense, the defendant oil companies may argue that the harmful
propensities of used oil have not been conclusively established and therefore
no duty exists which requires warnings based on information which is only
speculative. However, this argument was specifically rejected in Mason. The
court found that where scientific evidence exists which tends to show potential

102

1. at § 1910.1200(h)(3)(E) & (F).

103

The general public's perception of a substance's toxicity affects the way the
substance is handled. For instance, when California designated used oil as a hazardous
waste, more oil entered the state's used oil recycling program. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992).
This was a surprise to many; the Federal EPA has declined to list used oilas a hazardous
substance, even though it contains known toxicants, for fear that excessive regulation
would result in illegal disposal. 57 Fed. Reg. 21524 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992).
An explanation behind this "California experience" is based on the public
perception of governmental classifications. If the government determines that a
substance is dangerous enough to warrant a 'hazardous" classification, the public
appreciates the potential harm. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 at 33. If a substance is not considered
hazardous, then it can be poured out like dirty water. This phenomena is analogous to
personal hygiene. If a person believes a substance is harmful, he may employ protective
measures to protect himself. However, if a substance is viewed as harmless, it likely will
be handled as such.
104 See In reJoint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 BR. 710 at 739 (U.S. Navy required
respirators for asbestos work as early as 1943, however, use was not enforced and there
was official connivance in covering up the potential harm).
105EngineeringNews - System Changes Your Oil Automatically, With No Spills, DESIGN
NEWS, November 1,1993, at 35.
106
See generally Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985)(courts will
not allow industries to establish their own standards of conduct due to financial
influences which compromise safety).
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harm, the manufacturer may not ignore it solely because it finds the
information unconvincing. 10 7 The oil suppliers' argument should also fail
because product suppliers are generally required to conduct their own research
and testing into the potential harm their products can cause,108 even though
the tests required to establish chronic toxicity of a product may be very costly
and require a extended period of time to conduct. 109 The fact that the wording
used in the MSDS indicate a potential, yet unconfirmed, possibility of harm,
and the amount of monetary resources available to the oil suppliers,1 0 should
establish liability for failure to dearly define and communicate the harmful
propensities of used oil.
An alternative argument on behalf of the defendant oil companies would be
that, in the interest of a national standard, the federal regulations covering
MSDS preempt any efforts to warn that the oil manufactures may wish to
implement. Again, this argument was rejected in Mason. The court found that,
in determining the defendant's ability to know of the harm posed by its
product, the proper inquiry must focus on all sources of scientific knowledge,
not just information issued by the governmental agencies. 111
Motor oils sold to the general public do carry a warning concerning the
toxicity of used oils on the back label of the container.112 However, the fact that
the warning is not prominently displayed on the front of the label could
establish a basis for finding that an insufficient warning was given. Typically,
the courts have held that a warning should be sufficient to catch the attention
of the user.11 3 Changing or adding motor oil is not a complicated operation.
The most difficult part of the operation is locating the drain plug and
determining where to add fresh oil. This is not explained on the oil container,
thus making it improbable that anyone will read the label, or the warning. Also,
because all of the pertinent specifications describing the oil are located
prominently on the front of the container, 114 it is even more unlikely that
anyone will reference the back of the container.

107741 F. Supp. at 1483.
108

See Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of OccupationalSafety and
HealthLaw, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 969 (1987).
109Testing: EPA Adds Datato Rulemaking Record to Support Solid Waste Proposal Under
TSCA, CHEMICAL REGULATION REPORTER, January 15, 1988 (90 day testing of 73
substances would cost the manufacturers approximately six million dollars).
110 Robert C. Weinbaum, Moderator, Avoiding the House Divided: Mutual Strategiesfor
Inside and OutsideCounsel - Panel Discussion,56 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1987).
111741 F. Supp. at 1482.
112

See Valvoline oil bottle, supra note 81.

113

See Little v. PPG Indus. Inc., 594 P.2d 911 (Wash. 1979).

114

The Service Rating and Viscosity establishing the correct oil type for a particular

application. See Valvoline oil bottle, supranote 81.
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c. Statute of Limitations

In Sweger, besides challenging the causation issue, the defendant oil
companies requested summary judgment alleging that Sweger's suit was
barred by the statute of limitations.11 5 However, the district court denied the
defendants' statute of limitations motion.116 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the 10th Circuit refused to consider the defendants' appeal on this issue
because the causation issue was determinative. 117 However, had Sweger been
able to satisfy the causal element, the statute of limitation issue may have had
a significant impact on his case.
Statutes of limitations have been enacted by the federal and state
118
governments, setting a time limit in which certain actions must be brought.
In many early toxic tort suits, actions were sometimes barred by a court's strict
interpretation of the statute of limitations where the court held that the
plaintiff's injuries accrued at the time of exposure. 119 Because of the latent
nature of chronic injuries - symptoms which manifest themselves many years
after exposure - suits were often barred with no equitable remedy for the
injured party.
Developing primarily out of asbestos litigation, the "discovery rule" has been
used to eliminate this unjust, technical bar for toxic tort litigation. 120 Under the
discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff
knew, or should have known, of his illness. A minority of courts toll the statute
when the plaintiff knew of the defendant's wrongful conduct. 121 Regardless of
what knowledge a plaintiff is required to attain to toll the statute, the issue of
when the plaintiff acquired this knowledge is typically a question for the jury,
and not subject to summary judgment.122
A relatively new technical barrier used to limit liability by defendants in toxic
tort litigation, strikingly similar to statutes of limitations, is statutes of repose.
Unlike limitation statutes, which begin to toll when a plaintiff is injured, or, as
in latent injury, when the plaintiff learns of his disease, statutes of repose are
time limits which begin to toll when the product is either manufactured or
sold. 123 Because of the long latency periods for chronic toxicants, these time
limits can prevent a plaintiff from recovering if applied in toxic tort litigation.
115

See Sweger, WL 35345, at *1.

116Md.
1 17

d. at *6, n.1.

118W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 165 & n.9 (5th ed.
1984).
119
See Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1981).
120See GREER, supra note 48, § 3 at 4.
12

1d. § 3 at 5.

122

1d. § 3 at 6.

123

See GREER, supra note 48, § 3 at 7.
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Currently, the courts are mixed in their decisions on statute of repose challenges
where the victims are suffering from chronic illness. 124
Another unique issue in toxic tort litigation arises where a plaintiff initially
files suit for an earlier disease and later develops another, and usually more
severe, disease as a result of the same exposure. 125 This problem has lead to the
development of two unique and controversial forms of damages in toxic tort
litigation - increased risk of disease and costs of medical monitoring.
B. Damages
In most classic tort cases for personal injury, the injury, even mental anguish,
26
is a specific injury - pain and/or suffering - experience by the plaintiff.1
Perhaps due to the explosion of suits involving asbestos litigation, especially
involving Johns-Manville, and the fact that Johns-Manville has sought
protection in bankruptcy due to the huge potential liability it is facing, 127 many
plaintiffs have sought to recover for their increased future risk of injury generally cancer - which has yet to manifest any apparent symptoms.
Two relatively new forms of damages have arisen out of the threat of
potential future disease: damages for increased risk of disease and damages
for the cost of medical monitoring. 128 Here, the courts have allowed damages
based on a plaintiff's increased likelihood of contracting a disease due to his
prolonged exposure to a known toxicant. 129
These awards are significant when related to suits involving potential harm
due to a plaintiff's prolonged exposure to used oils. First, it should reduce the
burden of proof required of plaintiffs. Expert witnesses would not be required
to testify that the defendant's oil was a significant or major factor in causing the
injury, rather, they would only have to demonstrate that exposure to oil is likely
to result in future injury. The potential for harm caused by prolonged exposure
to oils has already been established by animal studies. This, and the fact that

124
25

1

1d. § 3 at 8.
Often referred to as "splitting," the majority of courts tend to allow the second

action, basing the statute of limitations on the discovery rule. The issue is unsettled
however, and it will likely re-occur in future litigation. Id. § 3 at 7.
126
KEETON, supranote 118.
127 See generallyKane, 843 F.2d at 636 (due to extensive pending liability resulting from
injury caused by its asbestos products, Johns-Manville filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).
128
A third form of damages which developed out of toxic tort litigation is the fear of
developing cancer in the future - cancerphobia - which is closely related to damages for
mental anguish under common tort actions. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 61, at 347.
129
See Herberv. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986)(claim for future cost
of medical monitoring and for emotional anxiety due to increased risk of cancer were
allowed); See also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.
1986)(recovery allowed based ona reasonable medical probability of contracting cancer
in the future), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
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many oils contain known carcinogens, would provide a basis for an expert to
testify that a person who has been exposed to those oils over a prolonged period
of time is likely to suffer future harm) 30 Second, should the courts grant
judgment for the plaintiffs covering payment for preventative medical
examinations, these examinations could establish a basis for later awards if
actual disease develops. Third, such awards could lay the ground work for
epidemiological studies necessary to understand the harm posed by prolonged
exposure to common lubricating oils. Finally, in an award of damages to cover
the cost of increased medical surveillance, the plaintiff would have a strong
argument that the courts should place the burden of the increased medical
examinations on the parties who have profited from the oils and on those most
able to bear the burden of the examinations - the oil suppliers.
V. CONCLUSION

As time goes on it is probable that an increasing number of individuals will
seek compensation for damages caused by the toxic effects of common
petroleum lubricating oils. Even today, with warnings appearing on oil
containers and Material Safety Data Sheets, lubricating oil is treated as a
relatively harmless substance, much as asbestos was treated during the mid
13
part of this century. '
This nonchalant treatment of oils may be due to several factors: inadequate
warnings issued by manufactures and suppliers of oil, inadequate
governmental regulation which tends to dispel the harm actually posed by oils,
the necessity of oil in our industrial society, and the inconvenience required to
safeguard persons whose daily work requires high levels of continuous
exposure..
Because of the burden of proof which requires a plaintiff to prove that a
defendant's oil was a major or significant factor in causing the plaintiff's
injury,132 and the present lack of epidemiological studies available which will
clearly establish the required link, 133 early cases based on chronic injury
resulting from prolonged exposure to used oil will present a high, but not
insurmountable, hurdle for plaintiffs. Animal studies which are indicative of
the harm posed by used oils and the fact that used oil contains known
carcinogenic substances will form a basis for expert testimony concerning used
oil's harmful nature.134 A first step in establishing a basis for damages may lie

130

See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535 (scientific certainty not required to allow expert
testimony).
131
1n reJoint E. and S. D. Asbestos Lit., 129 B.R. at 738 (between 1930 and 1935 reports
on asbestos appeared in the medical literature which discussed possible health risks
posed by asbestos).
132See 1991 WL 35345.
133

1

34

See Toxics Law Reporter, BNA Vol. 2, No. 38,1040 (1988).
Toxics Law Reporter,supra note 133.
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in an award of damages to cover the necessity of increased medical
examinations due to latent and chronic toxicity of used oil.135
An acknowledgment of the harm caused to those exposed to used oil today
could reduce the number of persons injured due to prolonged exposure to used
oil, thus reducing future liability for the oil industry. As further studies link
prolonged exposure to used lubricating oil to the resultant injury, the cost
imposed by society's misuse of oils will mandate that the courts award
damages to compensate the victims. 136 Our society's dependence on oils, the
commonalty of oils in our society, and the degree to which we tend to ignore
the harm posed by used oils should serve as an impetus for plaintiffs' suits.
These suits should be brought, not only to compensate those injured by the
chronic effects of used oil, but to enlighten the public to the nature of harm to
which million of persons are exposed on a daily basis.
RONALD P. TOMALLO, JR.

135Chemical Reg. Daily, supra note 29.
136

See W. Page Keeton, Introduction to Symposium on Development in Tort Law and Tort
Reform: Thoughts on Tort Reform, 18 ST. MARY's L.J. 669 (1987).

